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Abstract We study the online version of the classical parallel machine
scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from
a new perspective: We assume that the data of each job, namely its re-
lease date rj , its processing time pj and its weight wj is only known to
the job itself, but not to the system. Furthermore, we assume a decen-
tralized setting where jobs choose the machine on which they want to
be processed themselves. We study this problem from the perspective
of algorithmic mechanism design. We introduce the concept of a myopic
best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the dominant strategy
equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. We present a polyno-
mial time, online scheduling mechanism that, assuming rational behavior
of jobs, results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive. The
mechanism deploys an online payment scheme that induces rational jobs
to truthfully report their private data. We also show that the underly-
ing local scheduling policy cannot be extended to a mechanism where
truthful reports constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium.
1 Introduction
We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling prob-
lem to minimize the total weighted completion time – P | rj |
∑
wj Cj in the
notation of Graham et al. [1] – from a new perspective: We assume a strategic
setting, where the data of each job, namely its release date rj , its processing
time pj and its weight wj is only known to the job itself, but not to the system.
Any job j is interested in being finished as early as possible, and the weight wj
represents its indifference cost for spending one additional unit of time waiting.
While jobs may strategically report false values (r˜j , p˜j , w˜j) in order to be sched-
uled earlier, the total social welfare is maximized whenever the weighted sum
of completion times
∑
wj Cj is minimized. Furthermore, we assume a restricted
communication paradigm, referred to as decentralization: Jobs may communi-
cate with machines, but neither do jobs communicate with each other, nor do
machines communicate with each other. In particular, there is no central coor-
dination authority hosting all the data of the problem. This leads to a setting
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where the jobs themselves must select the machine to be processed on, and any
machine sequences the jobs according to a (known) local sequencing policy.
The problem P | rj |
∑
wj Cj is well-understood in the non-strategic setting
with centralized coordination. First, scheduling to minimize the weighted sum
of completion times with release dates is NP-hard, even in the off-line case [2].
Second, no online algorithm for the single machine problem can be better than
2-competitive [3] regardless of the question whether or not P=NP, and lower
bounds exist for parallel machines, too [4]. The best possible algorithm for the
single machine case is 2-competitive [5]. For the parallel machine setting, the
currently best known online algorithm is 2.61-competitive [6].
In the strategic setting, selfish agents trying to maximize their own benefit
can do so by reporting strategically about their private information, thus ma-
nipulating the resulting schedule. In the model we propose, a job can report
an arbitrary weight, an elongated processing time (e.g. by adding unnecessary
work), and it can artificially delay its true release date rj . We do not allow a job
to report a processing time shorter than pj , as this can easily be discovered and
punished by the system, e.g. by preempting the job after the declared processing
time p˜j before it is actually finished. Furthermore, as we assume that any job j
comes into existence only at its release date rj , it obviously does not make sense
that a job reports a release date smaller than the true value rj .
Our goal is to set up a mechanism that yields a reasonable overall perfor-
mance with respect to the objective function
∑
wj Cj . To that end, the mecha-
nism needs to motivate the jobs to reveal their private information truthfully. In
addition, as we require decentralization, each machine must be equipped with a
local sequencing policy that is publicly known, and jobs must be induced to se-
lect the machines in such a way that
∑
wj Cj is not too large. Known algorithms
with the best competitive ratio, e.g. [6,7], crucially require central coordination
to distribute jobs over machines. An approach by Megow et al. [8], developed for
an online setting with release dates and stochastic job durations, however, turns
out to be appropriate for being adopted to the decentralized, strategic setting.
Related Work and Contribution.Mechanism design in combination with
the design of approximation algorithms for scheduling problems has been studied,
e.g., by Nisan and Ronen [10], Archer and Tardos [11], and Kovacs [12]. In those
papers, not the jobs but the machines are the selfishly behaving parts of the
system, and their private information is the time they need to process the jobs.
A scheduling model where the jobs are the selfish agents of the system has
been studied by Porter [13]. He addresses a single machine scheduling problem,
where the private data of each job consists of a release date, its processing
time, its weight, and a deadline. In all mentioned papers, the only action of an
agent (machine or job, respectively) is to reveal its private data; the resulting
mechanisms are also called direct mechanisms. The model suggested in this paper
does not give rise to a direct mechanism, since in addition to the revelation of
private data, jobs must select the machine to be processed on.
In the algorithm of Megow et al. [8], jobs are locally sequenced according
to an online variant of the well known WSPT rule [9], and arriving jobs are
assigned to machines in order to minimize an expression that approximates the
(expected) increase of the objective value. This algorithm achieves a competi-
tive ratio of 3.281. The mechanism we propose develops their idea further. We
present a polynomial time, decentralized online mechanism, called Decentral-
ized LocalGreedyMechanism. Thereby we provide also a new algorithm for
the non-strategic, centralized setting, inspired by the MinIncrease Algorithm
of [8], but improving upon the latter in terms of simplicity. We show that theDe-
centralized LocalGreedy Mechanism is 3.281-competitive. This coincides
with the bound that is known for the non-strategic, centralized setting [7,8]. The
currently best known bound for the non-strategic setting, however, is 2.61 [6].
As usual in mechanism design, the Decentralized LocalGreedy Mech-
anism defines payments that have to be made by the jobs for being processed.
Naturally, we require from an online mechanism that also the payments are
computed online. Hence they can be completely settled by the time at which a
job leaves the system. We also show that the payments result in a balanced bud-
get. The payments induce the jobs to select ‘the right’ machines. Intuitively, the
mechanism uses the payments to mimic a corresponding LocalGreedy online
algorithm in the classical (non-strategic, centralized) parallel machine setting
P | rj |
∑
wj Cj . Moreover, the payments induce rational jobs to truthfully re-
port about their private data. With respect to release dates and processing times,
we can show that truthfulness is a dominant strategy equilibrium. With respect
to the weights, however, we can only show that truthful reports are myopic best
responses (in a sense to be made precise later). In addition, we show that there
does not exist a payment scheme extending the allocation rule of the Decen-
tralized LocalGreedy Mechanism to a mechanism where truthful reporting
of all private information is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
An extended abstract of this paper has been published in Algorithm Theory
- SWAT 2006, Volume 4059 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp 136-147.
Springer, 2006. A full version is currently under journal review.
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